Development and evaluation of a de-identification procedure for a case register sourced from mental health electronic records. by Fernandes,  Andrea C. et al.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
28 July 2015
Version of attached ﬁle:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Fernandes, Andrea C. and Cloete, Danielle and Broadbent, Matthew T.M. and Hayes, Richard D. and Chang,
Chin-Kuo (2013) 'Development and evaluation of a de-identiﬁcation procedure for a case register sourced from
mental health electronic records.', BMC medical informatics and decision making., 13 . p. 71.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1472-6947-13-71
Publisher's copyright statement:
c© 2013 Fernandes et al.; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
Development and evaluation of a de-identification
procedure for a case register sourced from mental
health electronic records
Andrea C Fernandes1, Danielle Cloete3, Matthew TM Broadbent1, Richard D Hayes1, Chin-Kuo Chang1,
Richard G Jackson3, Angus Roberts2, Jason Tsang1, Murat Soncul3, Jennifer Liebscher1, Robert Stewart1
and Felicity Callard1,4*
Abstract
Background: Electronic health records (EHRs) provide enormous potential for health research but also present data
governance challenges. Ensuring de-identification is a pre-requisite for use of EHR data without prior consent. The
South London and Maudsley NHS Trust (SLaM), one of the largest secondary mental healthcare providers in Europe,
has developed, from its EHRs, a de-identified psychiatric case register, the Clinical Record Interactive Search (CRIS),
for secondary research.
Methods: We describe development, implementation and evaluation of a bespoke de-identification algorithm used
to create the register. It is designed to create dictionaries using patient identifiers (PIs) entered into dedicated
source fields and then identify, match and mask them (with ZZZZZ) when they appear in medical texts. We
deemed this approach would be effective, given high coverage of PI in the dedicated fields and the effectiveness
of the masking combined with elements of a security model. We conducted two separate performance tests i)
to test performance of the algorithm in masking individual true PIs entered in dedicated fields and then found in
text (using 500 patient notes) and ii) to compare the performance of the CRIS pattern matching algorithm with a
machine learning algorithm, called the MITRE Identification Scrubber Toolkit – MIST (using 70 patient notes – 50
notes to train, 20 notes to test on). We also report any incidences of potential breaches, defined by occurrences of 3
or more true or apparent PIs in the same patient’s notes (and in an additional set of longitudinal notes for 50
patients); and we consider the possibility of inferring information despite de-identification.
Results: True PIs were masked with 98.8% precision and 97.6% recall. As anticipated, potential PIs did appear,
owing to misspellings entered within the EHRs. We found one potential breach. In a separate performance test,
with a different set of notes, CRIS yielded 100% precision and 88.5% recall, while MIST yielded a 95.1% and 78.1%,
respectively. We discuss how we overcome the realistic possibility – albeit of low probability – of potential breaches
through implementation of the security model.
Conclusion: CRIS is a de-identified psychiatric database sourced from EHRs, which protects patient anonymity and
maximises data available for research. CRIS demonstrates the advantage of combining an effective de-identification
algorithm with a carefully designed security model. The paper advances much needed discussion of EHR
de-identification – particularly in relation to criteria to assess de-identification, and considering the contexts of
de-identified research databases when assessing the risk of breaches of confidential patient information.
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Background
Electronic Health Records (EHRs) function as single,
complete, integrated electronic versions of the traditional
paper or part-electronic health records [1]. In 2002, an
England-wide implementation, which aimed to improve
patient care delivery, led to the growth of standardised
electronic health record keeping systems in hospitals
across England [2]. Soon after, the South London and
Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust (SLaM), one of the
largest mental health care providers in Europe, developed
an Electronic Psychiatric Clinical Records (EPCR) system,
namely the electronic Patient Journey System (ePJS) [1].
This replaced the previous system – of hard copy case
notes, a community-based electronic clinical record,
an inpatient patient administration system, adult mental
health and addictions service administration systems – with
a single, completely electronic system, where daily activities,
medication, diagnosis, correspondence and any other
information pertinent to patients attending this mental
health care specific facility are recorded [1]. Information
on ePJS can be accessed across all sites of SLaM by
authorised clinical staff. ePJS has been active for around
8 years and as of October 2012, it carries records (legacy
and active) for over 200 000 patients. As with many
EHRs, scope for using this electronic psychiatric case
register as a data source for research has been explored,
opening doors for better secondary research in psychi-
atric health.
EPCRs have a unique place in research [3]. Information
recorded in psychiatric registers is relatively more sensitive
compared with other clinical registers [4,5] and includes
material that contains the potential for stigmatization and
discrimination. Studies indicate that when consent has
been sought to use a person’s health data for research,
refusals tend to be most common if the research involves
matters of sexual or mental health [4,6]. A study sampling
15,997 general practice outpatients in Minnesota investi-
gating the impact of requiring patient authorisation on
research using medical records encouragingly found low
refusal rates overall (576 patients refused authorisation); of
those who refused, the greatest proportion was among
those seen for mental health reasons (8.5%) [6]. Another
study by Powell et al. of 50 consecutive primary care at-
tenders found that the most common items that patients
did not wish to share were related to mental health [7].
This could give rise to biased samples when conducting
mental-health-based studies. In addition, the findings indi-
cate that if the sample were entirely patients in a mental
health setting, a higher number would refuse sharing infor-
mation for research, potentially leading to low numbers
and reduced generalisability [6,7]. To avoid such draw-
backs and to encourage patient trust in use of patient data,
de-identification might offer a better route to use medical
records, in particular psychiatric records, for research [4].
In many jurisdictions, the requirements to use any
EHRs (including electronic psychiatric health records)
for research purposes usually stipulate a “consent or an-
onymise” approach. Anonymisation requires replacing,
removing or de-identifying information directly related
to the patient, referred to here as Patient Identifiers
(PIs) [8], so as to allow these medical records to be
harnessed for research purposes. If the patient has given
consent to use his or her records for research, then there
is no need to de-identify. On the other hand, an
anonymised database is one where the original database
has been stripped of PIs and where the identifier number
assigned to each individual has been replaced with an
anonymised identifier that is not linked in any way to the
original dataset.
A pseudonymised database is the same as the anonymised
database, except the original identifiers are in a securely
linked table, typically with a trusted third party.
A de-identified database is a database that typically
replaces or removes all PIs, as defined by specific national
regulations. While it is relatively straightforward to mask
structured fields containing identifying information, this is
more difficult for free text (or unstructured) fields in
EHR-sourced datasets, although it is here that many of
the most valuable data are contained, particularly for
mental healthcare.
In the United States, the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) specifies 18 PIs that need
to be removed or replaced to de-identify medical records
to be used in research; these include patient and non-
patient addresses, as well as all dates (except years) relating
to an individual [9,10]. The U.K., on the other hand,
provides broader guidance on the types of identifiers
that need to be de-identified, acknowledging that a “truly
anonymous dataset is unlikely to be useful for much
research” [8] and that appropriate de-identification has to
be designed based on the context of usage. Generally, in
the U.K., the concept of de-identifying medical records
means: i) replacing “key identifiable information” or key
patient identifiers (Table 1) [8,11]; ii) partially removing
strong PIs (e.g. date of birth or post codes) so as to make
them weak PIs (e.g. provide month and year of birth and
the first half of the post code) while maintaining research
value [8]; and iii) aggregating rare characteristics [8]. Each
National Health Service (NHS) organisation in the U.K. is
entrusted with a “Caldicott Guardian” and an accompany-
ing committee (which involves clinical and service user
representation) [12]. The overriding duty of the Caldicott
Guardian and the Caldicott Committee is to ensure that
patients’ confidentiality is properly ensured in any
context within the Trust. Any researcher attempting to
use medical records for research must consult and work
with the Caldicott Guardian and committee to agree on
an appropriately de-identified database, keeping in mind
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the implemented national regulations on patient data
confidentiality, as well as the technical and management
challenges of creating a research database [8].
SLaM undertook the initiative to build the Clinical
Record Interactive Search (CRIS) in 2007, and in 2008
CRIS received research ethics approval for use as an
interactive, de-identified database for secondary research
in mental health. The need for robust de-identification
of psychiatric case registers is particularly acute: both to
enable representative, reliable and valid evidence-based
research in psychiatric research, and to protect patient
identity and consolidate patient trust vis-à-vis use of
intimate data. CRIS has now been active for over 4 years
and is used by clinical staff and researchers to conduct
audits of services and research projects involving second-
ary data collection. CRIS has contributed to research on
Alzheimer’s disease, severe mental illness and its associa-
tions with mortality, early-stage psychosis and other more
rare disorders or syndromes [13-20]. The search system
enables specification of criteria that define the cohort of
interest (for example, patients with a given diagnosis or all
those whose records contain a key word or phrase within
a given time period) and then brings back any variables of
interest (for example, a structured field such as ethnicity,
or a free text field such as those used for case notes).
Based on these parameters, the CRIS application will
bring back a database of cases that meet the search
criteria (rows) with the requested output variables for
each case (columns).
The development of CRIS as well as descriptive data
have been described in detail [1] elsewhere. We focus
here on the development, implementation and evaluation
of the de-identification design for ePJS (to create CRIS),
which emerged through a series of discussions and meet-
ings that involved the Caldicott Committee, as well as a
Stakeholder Committee (which incorporated service user
representation and leadership, as well as additional service
user consultation). The main criteria according to which a
de-identification algorithm was designed comprised: i) the
protection of patient identity (including the sensitivities
that come with this database being a mental health care
database – e.g. unique, potentially stigmatizing, mental
health-related events described in the text), and ii) the
maximisation of research value (by maintaining the
characteristics of the psychiatric database and avoiding
over-de-identification).
CRIS – a combination of the de-identification algorithm
and security model
The algorithm (described in detail in the Methods section)
that was approved by the ethics board still had its share of
limitations, as do many other de-identification algorithms
[21]. We summarise these here, prior to providing the
specifics of the algorithm, so as to provide readers with
the broader context surrounding the development of
CRIS, as well as to clarify some of the decisions that were
made surrounding de-identification. In brief, the algorithm
does not identify PIs occurring in the CRIS text that are
not entered in the source system (un-entered PIs). This is
because, as we describe later on, the dictionary that our
algorithm uses is populated using data filled in dedicated
PI fields in the source system. Hence, any information not
entered in these fields will not be included in our
dictionary and will not be recognised when it occurs in
free text. Additionally, misspelt PIs in the source system
are not identified as PIs in CRIS text and hence are not
de-identified. There are two points to note here.
Firstly, it is possible for misspelt PIs and un-entered
PIs appearing in the CRIS text to compromise patient
anonymity. These issues were discussed before the
launch of the CRIS system by the Caldicott and CRIS
Stakeholder committees. A culmination of validation tests,
discussions and trials led to a consensus view that in-
stances of misspellings, nicknames, and un-entered pieces
of information occurring in isolation would not pose a
threat to identity in the absence of any other correct PI
(for example, the appearance of an incorrect date of
birth with no other information related to the patient).
Secondly, the dependency of our dictionary on data
populated in source may come across as a limitation;
however, the PI fields (in the source system) that contribute
to our dictionary are either mandatory fields to populate
(in the source system) or are fields that are highly
Table 1 List of key Patient Identifiers (PIs) specified to be
de-identified in the U.K. to create a de-identified
database as stipulated by the Caldicott Code on
Confidentiality
What are patient
identifiers?
First Name
Middle Name
Last Name
Current and Old Address Line 1
Current and Old Address Line 2
Current and Old Address Post code
Current and Old Telephone Numbers
Current and Old Email addresses
Date of birth
National Health Service (NHS) Identification
(ID) numbers*
Hospital specific ID numbers
Rare or unique characteristics
Aliases/Nicknames
*NHS numbers are assigned to every resident of the U.K.
These are all personal to the patient. There is no obligation to de-identify all
non-patient information such as clinical staff names.
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populated. The current total population of SLaM is greater
than 200 000 (these include legacy and active patients); of
these, all patients have a populated first and last name
field, as it is mandatory. Almost all of the patients, 99.7%,
have a valid date of birth filled in, and 98.5% of them have
at least one address entered. These high coverage figures
provided reassurance that we could develop our dictionary
from these data. The other reason why we invested trust
in creating a dictionary from source fields is because the
content of the record is informed by clinical utility (i.e. we
can make reasonably safe assumptions that if data are not
entered in the relevant PI forms, it is because they are not
known and therefore will not be included in other parts of
the records – such as daily notes or correspondence
notes). If this information comes to be known later on, it
would be the role of the clinical staff to enter the informa-
tion in the relevant source forms. (To test this assump-
tion, we did a search on records that did not have a date
of birth filled in and searched in their correspondence
notes for references to “date of birth”. Out of 517 patients
who do not have a valid date of birth, 10 records were
returned with a reference to “date of birth” in their corres-
pondence notes. Three were never admitted (though were
referred) to the hospital in the first place (and hence did
not have the date of birth entered in the source field). The
remaining 7 records did have reference to “date of birth”,
and these were fed back to the records administration
team to enter proper date of birth in the source records to
ensure masking on the CRIS system.) Based on this
assumption as well as the high coverage of the strong
patient identifier fields on the source system, we determined
that building the CRIS PI dictionary using the source
fields would suffice to mask any mention of PIs in the free
or structured text.
This being said, realistic possibilities of inference of
patient identity from misspellings, un-entered PIs, nick-
names, unique data or any other potential to recognise
individuals cannot be ignored for medical data. With this
in mind, the CRIS Stakeholder and Caldicott committees
established, in line with U.K. legislation on data de-
identification for research, a rigorous security model in
which to enmesh the CRIS de-identified dataset (described
in detail in the Methods section). Together with the
technical component, this security model plays an equally
important role in establishing a robustly de-identified
psychiatric research database. In essence, the security
model was designed to deal with the realities of
de-identifying databases, through acknowledging that all
datasets will have inaccuracies which will compromise
performance of the de-identification algorithm [22]. In
the Methods section we explain the technicalities of the
algorithm, the process for de-identifying records, the
security model and the evaluation study. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no literature thus far describing
the de-identification of psychiatric case registers [10,23].
Methods
CRIS de-identification process and algorithm
To create a data store of de-identified ePJS records, a
step-by-step process was followed to mask all PIs. Infor-
mation populated on the html front-end of ePJS (Figure 1)
is processed and stored in a secure Structured Query
CRIS
CRIS
Researcher
Figure 1 Diagrammatic description of converting source medical records (Electronic Patient Journey System [ePJS]) to Clinical Record
Interactive Search (CRIS).
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Language (SQL) database, which is updated as and when
new information is entered (on the front end). To popu-
late the CRIS search engine (Microsoft FAST™ Enterprise
Search Installation - the contents of which are copyrighted
and not disclosed here) with ePJS source data, the data
need to be converted into Extensible Mark-up Language
(XML). This is achieved by extracting all content from a
replicated SQL Server using a custom program called
SQL extractor. The SQL extractor code creates one XML
document per patient and stores all the details relevant to
the patient in this document, maintaining the same hier-
archical structure in which they are recorded on ePJS.
Once the SQL Extractor has finished extracting the source
SQL data into the required XML format, the patients’
records of various sizes are stored on disk before being
passed to FAST for ingesting. The FAST process ultim-
ately results in the production of a searchable index.
During the production of the index, the XML records
are modified using a transformation pipeline written in
Python that is accessed from within FAST. Different
stages during the transformation pipeline are responsible
for the de-identifying of the patient record. The de-
identification process is handled by two pipeline stages
which take in different configurations, so that the code
can determine not only what needs to be removed from
the XML but where in the XML the PI content can be
found. Each XML record is then passed through the pipe-
line stages for processing. We have outlined the process
below:
i) A list of all fields that contain PI information –
dedicated source fields. Along with the field name, a
field type is defined so that the code is aware of how
the values of the given field should be treated when
being added to the cleaning dictionary. For example,
if the field type defines it to contain information on
the name of the patient, the information will be
added to the cleaning dictionary and in addition this
field will be stripped from CRIS completely so as not
to appear at all in CRIS. If, on the other hand, the
field contains postcode information, the code will
add the postcode to the dictionary and in addition,
will truncate this field so that only the first half (3 or
4 letters) of the postcode appears in CRIS (this is to
mask patient identity and maintain research value by
retaining some geographical information). Unlike
many other de-identification algorithms, CRIS does
not derive its dictionary from population registries
[23]. Instead, the dictionary is populated with terms
derived from the patient forms in the source EHR
(Table 2). This method has been used in other de-
identification systems [24,25]; however many have
been supplemented with tools to recognise misspelt
names such as the name nearness matching
[23,25,26]. A CRIS dictionary (also known as the
cleaning list) hence will be different for each patient.
Information from patients’ first names, last names,
contact numbers, key person contacts, addresses and
alias/former name fields are extracted from the
source, stripped of delimiters (such as apostrophes
and hyphens in names) and added to the dictionary.
ii) A list of XML tags or scopes. To save processing
time, the de-identification algorithm is not run
across the whole of the XML. Instead, areas – called
XML tags or XML scopes - are flagged for the de-
identification algorithm and they determine where
the algorithm should run. These essentially are all
Table 2 An example of the CRIS dictionary
ePJS Source fields
First name Joe
**Middle name (blank)
Second name Bloggs
*Date of birth 20/08/1987
Trust ID 12–34–56
Post Code SW9 6TJ
**Nick Name (blank)
**Key Contact First Name (blank)
Key Contact Last Name O’Connell
CRIS PI Dictionary list derived from the source field above
Joe
Bloggs
20/08/1987
20/08/’87
20–08–1987
20–08–87
20.08.1987
20.08.87
20.8.87
20th Aug 1987
20th Aug ‘87
20th of August 1987
20th of Aug 1987
12–34–56
123456
12 34 56
SW9 6TJ
SW96TJ
Connell
*There would be many more options of recording the date of birth; a non-
exhaustive list is provided here.
**The cells show no information was entered in these fields and hence are not
included in the CRIS PI dictionary. Note that these fields are patient identifier
fields that sometimes do not get filled in the source.
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“free text” fields (e.g. the case note and
correspondence fields, where almost 60% of all data
on CRIS are recorded), core patient information
forms and summary title fields. Typically, all fields in
which there is a possibility of mentioning a PI have
been assigned as XML tags. A list of these is
presented in Table 3.
iii)A masking string to indicate what the removed words
should be replaced with. Words are replaced with
ZZZZZ for patient identifiers and with QQQQQ for
relative or close contact identifiers (see Figure 2). We
chose not to replace each type of PI with a generic
word describing the type of PI (e.g. FIRST NAME,
ADDRESS LINE, DATE OF BIRTH) as there is usually
sufficient contextual information from which it is
possible to deduce what the type of PI could be.
iv)Address aliases. A list of known variations in
addresses (e.g. road/rd, street/st,) helps the cleaning
processes find instances of addresses that may not
have been entered identically to what was placed in
the address fields. Address aliases are a particular
focus, because any details appearing in the CRIS text
regarding current patient address pose a stronger
threat to anonymity compared to any other PI.
With the abovementioned information, the python code
uses the configured fields to build up the cleaning diction-
ary. As the dictionary is being built, heuristics are used to
accommodate for different PI formats (or patterns). This
is an important feature that helps CRIS recognise all forms
of PIs (or patterns) mentioned in the text, particularly
through accommodating the variety of formats in which
a PI can be recorded in free-text fields. For example, a
mobile telephone number can be written in a standard
format (00000 – 000 – 000) or can be written out as one
number with no spaces (00000000000). Tables 4, 5 and 6
are examples of the heuristics written for names, date of
births and postcodes, respectively. All the other heuristics
written to capture word dates, phone numbers, NHS
numbers and addresses are presented in Table 7.
Table 3 List of XML scopes or XML tags, through which the de-identification algorithm is run
All free text fields Summary texts, Event notes, Correspondence notes,
Ward Progress Notes, etc.
All structured fields that would be populated, in the source system, with strong
PIs are completely removed on CRIS
NHS number field, Trust specific ID field, First Name,
Middle Name, Last Name, Telephone Number, etc.
All structured fields that would be populated, in the source system, with strong
PIs that are also valuable for research, are converted into weak identifiers
Date of Birth, Post Code, Ethnicity, etc.
Figure 2 Source Electronic Patient Journey System (ePJS) record input and CRIS output. Note that in this example we are using the
dictionary from Table 2. “Jie” and “Mary” have not been masked because of being a typographical error and un-entered PI, respectively. All details
in this record are fictitious: any resemblance to real persons is entirely coincidental. Also note that there are no legal requirements to de-identify
names of clinical staff such as “Terry Scott”, the fictitious assistant psychologist, whose name therefore appears in full in the CRIS record.
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Once the dictionary is complete, the python code
reads in the XML tags and uses a regular expression to
determine terms and tokens within the XML tags that
need to be removed from each record. This is based on
a set of rules for each token/term to determine where
both the start and end of the token can be found. The
start of a token is defined as i) one where the immediate
prefix does not contain letters or numbers, ii) where
the prefix is the start of a sentence or iii) any word
which start as a new line (i.e. there is no prefix). The
end of a token is defined as i) one whose suffix does
not contain letters or numbers or ii) whose suffix is the
end of a sentence (indicated by full-stops, commas,
colons, semi-colons and hyphens). Once a token/term
has been identified, it is compared against the cleaning
dictionary, and when a match is found the resulting
token is replaced with the required masking string. A
python code implements the de-identification algorithm
to create the dictionary and then identify, match and
replace PIs in the text. This code can be configured to
add fields or tags without having to change the underlying
code base.
Table 4 Heuristics to identify names, with entirely fictitious examples, as they would appear in the source record and
CRIS output
Algorithm to identify names
<beginning > <name term > <optional_name_delimiters > <optional_s > <end >
Source record <beginning> <name term> <optional_name_delimiters> <optional_s> <end> CRIS de-identified
output
…replaced. Mark will also
be able…
.(space) Mark None None (space) …replaced. ZZZZZ
will also be able…
…knowing Mark’s
diagnosis…
(space) Mark ‘ S (space) …knowing ZZZZZ
diagnosis…
…7)Mark is compliant… ) Mark None None (space) …7)ZZZZZ is compliant…
…OMark is compliant… No beginning
identified
None None None None …OMark is compliant…
…was awarded 9 mark
out of 30 in…
(space) mark None None (space) …was awarded 9
ZZZZZ out of 30 in…
…Nurse informed Mark.
Earlier…
(space) Mark None None . …Nurse informed
ZZZZZ. Earlier…
…Marik will be
attending…
(space) None identified
due to misspelling
None None None …Marik will be
attending…
…O’Mark is at the… O’ Mark None None (space) …ZZZZZ is at the…
…his father, John, was
also present…
, (space) John , None (space) …his father, QQQQQ,
was also present…
Table 5 Heuristics to identify date of birth, with entirely ficitious examples, as they would appear in source records
and CRIS output
Algorithm to identify date of birth (Number date)<beginning > <day|month|year >
<one_date_delimiter > <day|month|year > <one_date_delimiter > <day|month|year > <end>
Source
record
<beginning> <day|
month| year>
<date_delimiter> < day|
month|year>
<date_delimiter> <day|
month|year>
<end> CRIS
output
Dob: 01/01/
2001
: 01 / 01 / 2001 (space) Dob:
ZZZZZ
1st of January
2001
(Space) 1st (space) of (space) January (space) 2001 (space) ZZZZZ
…born in Jan
1st 01…
(space) Jan (space) 1st (space) 01 (space) …born in
ZZZZZ…
…01-01-’01… (space) 01 - 01 -‘ 01 (space) …ZZZZZ…
…01 Jan 2001 (space) 01 (space) Jan (space) 2001 (space) …ZZZZZ…
Dob: 01//01/
2001
: 01 / None identified owing
to typographical error
in the source record
None None None Dob: 01//
01/2001
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The CRIS security model
The CRIS Oversight Committee (which evolved from the
Stakeholder Committee, after CRIS received research ethics
approval as a de-identified database) comprises the central
governance entity overseeing security. Access to CRIS is
application-based. Potential users submit an application to
the CRIS Oversight Committee, in which they are asked
to describe their project and the variables of interest. The
committee, chaired by a mental health service user, also
includes a child and adolescent mental health clinical
representative, a representative of the Trust’s Caldicott
Guardian, a Research Ethics representative, the CRIS
academic project lead and the CRIS project manager.
Potential applications looking to conduct audit of clinical
services using CRIS need to gain approval from the relevant
audit committee (within SLaM) before applying to use
CRIS. Likewise, research project applicants need a senior
university or NHS affiliated supervisor attached to and
taking responsibility for the project and applicant before
applying to use CRIS. Each applicant must have a formal
affiliation in the form of an honorary or substantive con-
tract with the hospital or the university before applying to
access CRIS. These formally bind the applicant to the
NHS duty of confidentiality when dealing with patient
data (including de-identified patient data) [27].
Upon submission, the Oversight Committee determines
whether a project is deemed suitable to access the CRIS
database. “Suitability” is ascertained by verifying the need
for the project, the scientific robustness of the application,
and any patient confidentiality concerns to which the
project may give rise. Any projects with the potential to
identify patients, such as those investigating rare disorders
or outcomes, are carefully discussed with the researcher
and their supervisor and, where possible, alternatives pro-
vided (for example, the applicant is encouraged to obtain
patient consent).
If researchers receive approval to use the CRIS system
for the submitted project, they are permitted to access
CRIS only within the SLaM security firewall and must
follow a set of rules which facilitate responsible handling
of data and uphold duties of confidentiality. All projects
are audited weekly to ensure searches are being carried
out within the remit of the submitted and approved project.
Approval to use CRIS can be withdrawn in cases where
inappropriate searches have been made in violation of the
terms of the approved project. These procedures focus on
close regulation of access to CRIS, as well as close moni-
toring of use of CRIS (Figure 3). The researcher must
commit to ensuring that s/he will uphold the NHS duty of
confidentiality when handling the data and adhere to the
Table 6 Heuristics to identify post codes, with entirely fictitious examples, as they would appear in source records and
CRIS output
Algorithm to identify post codes < postcode>::= source postcode
Source record Source postcode CRIS output
He lives at EN1 5SR EN1 5SR He lives at ZZZZZ
Lives at EN1. No… None Lives at EN1. No…
Lives at EN1 S5R None identified owing to typographic error Lives at EN1 S5R
Table 7 Algorithms to de-identify date of birth (word form), phone numbers, NHS identification numbers and addresses
Algorithm to identify date of birth (Word date)
<word_date> ::= < beginning > <day > <spaces > <day_suffix > <spaces > <optional_word_delimiter > <spaces > <word_month > <spaces
> < optional_comma > <spaces > <year > <end > | < beginning > <word_month > <spaces > <optional_month_delimiter >
<spaces > <day > <spaces > <day_suffix > <spaces > <optional_comma > <spaces > <year > <end>
Algorithm to identify phone numbers
<phone_number> ::=<optional_open_bracket > <first 5 digits > <optional_close_bracket > <space > <digits 6-8 > <space > <digits 9-11 > |
<optional_open_bracket > <first 3 digits > <optional_close_bracket > <space > <digits 4-7 > <space > <digits 8-11 > |
<optional_open_bracket > <first 4 digits > <optional_close_bracket > <space > <digits 5-7 > <space > <digits 8-11>
<nhsnumber> Algorithm to identify NHS Identification numbers::= < numeral1 > <number_delimiters > <numeral2 > <number_delimiters >
… < numeraln>
Algorithm to identify addresses
< address> ::= < address_term1 > | < address_term2 > …. <address_termn>
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guidelines set out by CRIS (including not carrying data
out of the Trust firewall for any purpose). In this way,
the security model endeavours significantly to mould
the researcher’s intentions – and hence behaviour – when
encountering the data, so as to minimize any threats
posed to patient anonymity identified above.
Evaluation of CRIS
We evaluated the CRIS de-identification algorithm on
performance in two ways. Firstly, by presenting precision
and recall; also by separately comparing its performance
to a machine learning de-identification tool – the MITRE
Identification Scrubber Toolkit (MIST) – developed by
the MITRE Corporation [28] to ascertain CRIS’ perform-
ance relative to this open source algorithm [28]. Secondly,
we evaluated the potential to infer information (acknow-
ledging that this is a standard limitation of all de-identified
research databases). The CRIS evaluation study was
conducted in April 2012 and hence the same set was not
used during the development of the CRIS system. The
methods used to evaluate each above-mentioned aspect are
discussed below:
(i) Performance testing – precision and recall
To test performance, we extracted a random selection
of 500 patients’ notes (events and correspondence) from
the CRIS system to obtain recall (the number of PIs the
algorithm de-identified out of all the PIs in the given
text) and precision (the proportion of PIs de-identified
that were correctly de-identified) for the algorithm. We
specifically looked for instances of PI that were entered
in the dedicated source fields and still found in the CRIS
text – true PIs. It is important to note that misspellings
and PIs not entered in the source patient information
forms but mentioned in the free text (un-entered PIs)
were excluded in the first part of the evaluation study,
as the algorithm had not been designed to capture
these. Each note was compared with its corresponding
note in the source system to ascertain what should be
de-identified.
To test CRIS performance with the MIST system, we de-
cided to train MIST with a set of 50 day-to-day events
notes and, we trained it to de-identify First Names (FN)
and Last Names (LNs) only for ease of analysing data and
training the model as accurately as possible (in depth de-
tails of how MIST works is published in Aberdeen et al.,
2010) [28]. We present separate recall and precision rates
for MIST and CRIS in Table 8.
Figure 3 CRIS security model.
Table 8 Precision and recall rates from the machine learning approach and CRIS’ pattern matching approach
Types of PI MIST performance CRIS performance
Total Number of Notes scanned 20 20
Total number of PI instances 191 191
Number of PIs correctly identified and masked (True Positives) 154 169
Number of PIs that should have been masked (False Negatives) 43 22
Number of instances masked that should not have been masked (False Positives) 8 0
Precision 95.1% 100%
Recall 78.1% 88.5%
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(ii)Potential for breaches and inferring information
To test for potential breaches, we manually scanned
each note (500) for a potential breach. Currently, there
is no set precedent for how many combinations of PIs
(correct or incorrect) need to appear to constitute a
potential breach. The CRIS Stakeholder and Caldicott
committees agreed by consensus that a breach would be
constituted by 3 or more correct PIs, or 3 or more
misspelt but strong potential PIs, either in a single note or
in a series of notes for a single individual. Additionally, we
randomly selected 50 patients and scanned through their
events notes longitudinally. We looked at an average of 20
sequential notes for each of the 50 patients. In doing so, we
mimicked the way in which the CRIS system is currently
being used by users (i.e. usually projects require scanning of
more than one note for a single patient to obtain data).
We provide in the Results and Discussion section a
largely narrative presentation of the possibility to infer
information from the data, as CRIS presents de-identified
data at patient level, and discuss the role of the security
model to protect the de-identified data.
Results
(i) Performance testing – precision and recall
Our evaluation study of 500 event and correspondence
notes yielded 97.6% recall and 98.8% precision rates
(Table 9). In other words, the algorithm was successful
in recognising and masking correctly recorded PIs in
CRIS text and the various ways in which they can be
recorded in free-text. These high precision and recall in
our evaluation study is a cumulative result of the technical
changes made to the CRIS de-identification algorithm
from regular, smaller-scale, informal tests of the algorithm
conducted throughout the 3 years. (For example, one of
the results from the earlier tests showed that the algorithm
was not recognising PIs in different formats. The algorithm
was subsequently amended to take this into account.)
(Of note, CRIS also de-identifies patient relative or close
contact information to increase patient anonymity, al-
though there is no legal stipulation to do so. We do
not refer to or discuss patient relative/close contact de-
identification further in this paper in order to maintain
simplicity. In essence, rules mentioned here are applicable
to patient relative or close contact identifiers as well.)
As noted earlier, during the development and post-launch
of CRIS it was acknowledged that this de-identification de-
sign is limited in that in cannot de-identify misspelt PIs
and un-entered PIs; these would still appear in the CRIS
text. Within the 500 notes, we found 89 potential in-
stances of PI: 63 instances of misspellings and 26 instances
of un-entered PIs in the source. These, as expected, were
not de-identified, and could be counted as potential PIs
(Table 10). ‘Potential’ here implies that the source PI might
be guessed or inferred: it does not imply an instance com-
prising an actual, recorded PI. (An example of a ‘potential’
PI would be a nickname that is not entered in the relevant
source (Alias) forms, is hence not included in the CRIS PI
dictionary, and hence will not be masked in CRIS text).
In our comparison study with a machine learning ap-
proach, the CRIS pattern matching based precision and
recall rates fared better (Table 8) – precision 100% (CRIS)
versus 95.1% (MIST) and recall 88.5% versus 78.1%,
respectively. The results suggest that while a machine
learning approach has the ability to de-identify misspell-
ings or nicknames, it also has increased scope to de-
identify clinical staff names and generic terms. Having said
this, the machine learning algorithm was trained only after
a single run and Aberdeen et al.’s paper suggests training
its algorithm after several test runs [28]. Our study also
showed that CRIS precision and recall on its own are high
enough and with potential for incorporating an approach
to mask nicknames and misspellings. We acknowledge
that a machine learning approach may have performed
better had we performed a second or third run; and that a
combination of a pattern matching together with a
machine learning approach may accomplish the masking
of misspellings or nicknames as well. However this was a
limitation that we had already thought of and addressed
(see ‘CRIS – a combination of the de-identification algo-
rithm and security model’ in the Background section) dur-
ing the development of CRIS. We maintain that machine
learning and pattern matching have their share of advan-
tages and disadvantages [28] and have assurance that for
the purposes of CRIS use, the de-identification algorithm
performs exceptionally well (Tables 8, 9, and 10) and is
made further robust with our tight security model in place.
(ii)Potential for breaches and inferring information
Only 1 patient note out of 500 patient notes generated
multiple appearances of potential PI material that fitted
Table 9 Precision and recall from the CRIS performance
test
Types of PI Frequency
Total Number of Notes scanned 500
Total number of PI instances 3603
Number of PIs correctly identified and masked 3573
Number of PIs that should have been masked 89*
Number of instances masked that should not have
been masked
30
Precision 98.8%
Recall 97.6%
*See Table 10.
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our definition of a breach (see Methods section) (Table 11).
Out of the series of 50 patients’ notes manually scanned
for PIs, we found, encouragingly, no notes with three or
more instances of potential PIs (i.e. no breaches were
found). While those instances that were found could
potentially pose a threat to anonymity we argue that the
intention of the researcher (cf. a researcher actively wish-
ing to re-identify with a researcher who is attentive to the
threat of identification and adhering to the duty of confi-
dentiality) who comes across this information plays a key
role in determining whether the information poses a
threat to patient anonymity. Moreover, El Emam et al. em-
phasise that the verification of identity is important [22] be-
cause otherwise we cannot be sure whether the information
is indeed a PI. El Emam et al. point out three reasons for
verification: first, the potential PI could match another pa-
tient and hence is not specific to the patient; second, the
information could be incorrect (as with our 3 misspelt
pieces of information relating to patient 1, in Table 11);
and third, there is no way of finding out if the information
is true if the researcher (or an adversary, if s/he is actually
intending to seek out identifiable information) cannot
verify the information for its correctness. Finally, the data
could be old and outdated, hence making the information
potentially redundant [22].
It is important to emphasize that completely de-identified
records and incorrect or un-verifiable information in con-
text may bring about opportunities for inference breaches
[29]. In fact, after scanning through the sequential notes,
we did find one instance of a patient’s prison contact
phone number, prison reference number and his misspelt
last name. Though these do not constitute our definition
of a breach (Table 11), we cannot deny that these instances
of information that appear on CRIS – owing to not being
entered in the source system, being misspelt or because we
do not identify them in the algorithm as being PIs – may
comprise data from which we can infer patient information
(Table 12).
In addition, data on CRIS are not aggregated and in-
formation is provided at de-identified patient level.
Opting not to aggregate data comes with its share of
advantages and disadvantages. The advantages include
avoiding considerable information loss (distortion of the
original information after de-identification) [30], which
makes the de-identified research database more valuable
(i.e. we generalise neither age, nor date references) [8].
The major disadvantage lies in the potential to identify a
patient through combinations of contextual data, even
when all PIs are masked and there are no incorrect PIs.
Mental health is, once again, a particularly sensitive do-
main in this regard: media reporting of high-profile events
in which a person’s mental health status is assumed to play
a role can mean that a small number of patients could be
at risk of de-anonymisation by virtue of researchers recog-
nizing contextual details in a patient’s de-identified record.
The security model, as mentioned earlier, is designed to
Table 10 Instances of ‘potential’ PIs: none of which is a breach as none occurred in isolation
Number of instances Reasons
Number of ‘potential’ PI instances in the notes
(within 500 notes)
89 70.9% due to misspellings; 20.9% due to PIs being un-entered
in source
Type of Potential PIs
Patient Nickname 20 Un-entered PI
Patient First Name 18 Un-entered PI or misspellings
Old Address Post Code 14 Un-entered PI or misspellings
Patient Date of Birth 13 Un-entered PI or misspellings
Patient Contact Number 2 Un-entered PI
Patient Last Name 10 Un-entered PI or misspellings
Old Address Line 1 5 Un-entered PI or misspellings
Patient Middle Name 4 Un-entered PI
Old Address Line 2 2 Un-entered PI or misspellings
Old Address Line 3 1 Un-entered PI or misspellings
Table 11 Instance of a potential breach: 3 or more PIs appearing for a single patient
Patient Type of PI Year of document Reason for appearance on CRIS Confidence in re-identification
1 Patient third line of address 2006 Misspellings Low: Outdated information, and cannot be verified,
and incorrect spellings [22]
Patient post code
Patient last name
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compensate for these limitations: it is intended to protect
the integrity of the data as much as possible without com-
promising their research value.
Discussion
Other approaches to de-identification
To conclude our evaluation of the CRIS de-identification
algorithm, we would like to point out that the CRIS
de-identification algorithm was not designed to compete
with other algorithms, but rather to provide a novel means
of de-identifying a database in a bespoke way for psychiatric
research that is likely to rely particularly on information
from free text fields.
The CRIS de-identification algorithm is not designed
to distinguish ambiguous names from real names; for
example, adjectives or nouns that could also be names
would be de-identified (e.g. the word ‘mark’ would be
de-identified alongside the name ‘Mark’). However, our
evaluation study did not record any de-identification of
generic terms, suggesting that the probability of this
over-de-identification is low. There are means to curb this
if necessary: El Emam et al. describes a version of the
k-anonymity algorithm (an algorithm that is commonly
used to define criteria to anonymise databases), where
the amount of information loss is “calculated” based on
generalisation and suppression values and the optimum
replacement combination is chosen to reduce information
loss as much as possible [30].
Several competitive evaluation tasks have looked at
de-identification, including Informatics for Integrating
Biology and the Bedside (i2b2) challenges, which involve
the release of fully de-identified notes from a research
patient data repository so as to enhance the ability of
natural language processing (NLP) tools to extract fine-
grained information from clinical records [31]. These
evaluation tasks are not analogous to the evaluation we
describe here, for several reasons: first, the i2b2 datasets do
not include the structured data used by our algorithm and
which are usually available for real-life de-identification
tasks; second, the competitive tasks do not consider context
of use (in comparison to the CRIS context, which includes
the existence of a security model and regulated access to
the CRIS system); third, these competitive tasks have been
applied to registers other than those used in psychiatric
research [21].
Converting the SLaM psychiatric case register into a
research database has drawbacks in common with other
case registers, because the data are not collected primarily
for research purposes. The recording of clinical notes is
noisy and non-standardised, and inevitably contains typo-
graphical errors. Nonetheless, the potential research value
of such information is huge [32,33]. A systematic review
by El Emam et al. could not show enough evidence that
identity could be inferred from de-identified databases,
but highlighted claims that data could be re-identified
with “relative ease” [22]. One characteristic of anonymised
or de-identified registers may be that it is virtually impos-
sible to replace all PIs, aggregate all unique information
and maintain the research value of the database [8]. Data
custodians and researchers may therefore need to acknow-
ledge that this is an inevitable constraint of these kinds of
data.
Conclusion
The growing realization of the extent and depth of data
found within EHRs means that both health researchers
and policy makers are showing increasing interest in
extracting information from textual documents within
EHRs for secondary purposes [23]. There is a clear need
for more comparative research on the development and
evaluation of de-identification algorithms that are appro-
priate for use within different kinds of legislative frame-
works and in relation to the demands of different kinds
of health systems. There is also a need for ongoing con-
sideration of which criteria – and which PIs – to use
when assessing the effectiveness of de-identification
strategies, as well of how and by whom de-identified
health research databases are used in order appropriately
to assess the risk of breaches of confidential patient
information. We believe that our paper responds to both
these needs.
The de-identification design that we describe in this
paper makes clear the importance of developing and
implementing both technical and procedural mechanisms
to protect patient identity. These mechanisms must be
appropriate both in relation to the nature of the data being
Table 12 Potential instances that could lead to inferring patient information
Patient Type of PI Year of document Number of sequential records
read to obtain this information
Reason for appearance on
CRIS
Confidence in
re-identification
2 Patient prison reference number 2012 12 No rule to de-identify prison
reference numbers or prison
contact information
Low: cannot be verified,
and misspellings [22]
Prison contact phone number Typographical error in
patient’s last name
Patient last name
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de-identified and as regards the contexts in which these
data will be used. Access to data held within CRIS is
tightly monitored, and we undertake significant and regular
auditing of CRIS searches. Our approach to de-identifica-
tion differs from contexts in which de-identified data are
widely shared, where the risks of re-identification are
arguably greater. CRIS is evaluated regularly to monitor
its masking abilities and also to highlight any drawback in
de-identification that may occur over time (e.g. new styles
of recording PIs, technical glitches, or procedural failures).
We have judged the algorithm described here to be optimal
for the CRIS dataset: it is a simple module that is
highly customizable to deal with changes in data entry,
so that when limitations are recognised, large algorithm
re-developments are not required and as mentioned above
CRIS can also be generalised to other systems if needed.
The algorithm whose development, implementation and
evaluation we have presented here shows good precision
and recall rates and low probability of combinations of
true PIs occurring. We consider this algorithm, alongside
the security measures that we have designed to surround
its use, to be an example of a simple design with perform-
ance comparable to other de-identification algorithms,
which advances the development of databases for secondary
research with psychiatric case registers.
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